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Abstract
This paper develops a new multilateral decomposition procedure for the analysis of wage
differentials and applies this to the racial wage hierarchy in the South African labour
market.  Using microdata on male workers from the 1994 October Household survey, it is
found that whites received the highest wages followed by asians, then coloureds and
finally blacks.  Productivity differences are shown to explain approximately two thirds of
the white and black wage differentials, with the unexplained residuals attributable to
discriminatory overpayment of whites and underpayment of blacks, and virtually all of the
asian and coloured differentials.  The results provide the basis for a discussion of post-
apartheid policy initiatives to tackle racial inequalities in the labour market.
JEL Classification: J71, J31
I INTRODUCTION
The gradual erosion and final collapse of the apartheid regime has stimulated a
large and still growing literature on the effects of racial discrimination on the labour
market of the Republic of South Africa [see, for example, Human and Greenacre, 1987;
Knight and McGrath, 1987; Moll, 1992, 1995a; Rospabe, 1997].  The particular
contribution of this paper is to provide a multilateral decomposition analysis of racial wage
differentials into discrimination and productivity components using evidence drawn from
the 1994 October Household survey.  Knight and McGrath [1987, p.245] define racial
wage discrimination as ‘differences in earnings among people of different races but of
equal productivity as determined by their endowments of such economic characteristics as
ability and human capital’.  Racial groups may also vary systematically in their productivity
levels due to the practice of pre-labour market discrimination, most notably in the
differential provision of and access to education and vocational training.  The survey year
is itself significant since 1994 marks the beginning of the post-apartheid era with the
political succession of the African National Congress (ANC) over the white-dominated
National Party government.  In the light of subsequent reforms of both the labour market
and the provision of education and training, the study establishes a baseline for the evaluation
of post-apartheid policies to reduce racial wage differentials in the labour market.
The starting point for our study is the simple observation that South Africa is a
multiracial society: the system of apartheid laws recognised whites, asians, coloureds and
blacks as the four main racial groups.  In the labour market, a racial wage hierarchy exists
with whites at the top receiving the highest earnings on average, the asians and coloureds
in the middle, and the blacks at the bottom.  We seek to explore the basis for this hierarchy
by means of a multilateral analysis of the pattern of racial wage differentials in contrast to
previous studies which have been limited to binary comparisons of the wage position of
whites with that of one or more of the non-white groups [Human and Greenacre, 1987;
Knight and McGrath, 1987; Moll, 1992, 1995a].  Moreover, we do not assume that the
non-discriminatory wage structure corresponds to the observed structure of any particular
racial group but instead allow for the possibility that wage discrimination takes the form of
over-payment of some races, as a result of either employee discrimination or employer
nepotism, and under-payment of others due to employer discrimination.
We develop the basis for a multilateral analysis by generalising existing techniques
for the decomposition of the logarithmic gross wage differential between two groups into
an explained component due to differences in productivity and an unexplained component
attributed to wage discrimination [see Oaxaca, 1973; Cotton, 1988; Neumark, 1988;
Oaxaca and Ransom, 1988, 1994].  First, in addition to the usual decomposition of the
discrimination component in terms of the geometric mean wage that each group receives
relative to that which it would receive in the absence of discrimination [Oaxaca, 1973], we
also partition the gross wage differential and the productivity component.  These further
decompositions yield complementary measures of the geometric mean wage of each racial
group relative to that of the workforce as a whole under both the (observed)
discriminatory and (hypothetical) non-discriminatory wage structures.  Second we extend
the application of the employment share [Cotton, 1988] and pooled Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) [Neumark, 1988; Oaxaca and Ransom, 1988, 1994] estimators of the
non-discriminatory wage structure in order to obtain estimators of a common non-
discriminatory wage structure for the multiple group case.
We undertake our empirical analysis at both the aggregate and occupation specific
level, both to provide a fuller analysis of discrimination and productivity differentials and
to examine the sensitivity of the results to the choice of aggregation level.  Like other
decomposition techniques, our methodology measures discrimination indirectly as the
residual component from an estimated wage function.  Inevitably, errors in the
specification of the wage determination model will lead to inaccurate estimates of
discrimination.  In addition, the results are sensitive to the specification and estimation of
the non-discriminatory wage structure.  However, data problems preclude a more direct
approach to the measurement of racial wage discrimination.
The structure of the paper is as follows.  In the following section we provide some
background information on the nature of the South African labour market and briefly
review previous work measuring the extent of racial wage discrimination.  Section III
develops our methodological framework for the multilateral decomposition of racial wage
differentials into discrimination and productivity components.  In Section IV we consider
the nature of the sample data provided by the 1994 October Household survey and the
specification of the wage determination equations.  The main empirical findings of the
paper are then given in Section V which presents the results of the wage function and
decomposition analyses.  Finally, the concluding section contains a summary of the
findings and considers the implications of the results for policy in the post-apartheid era.
II BACKGROUND
As is well documented, the various National Party governments were responsible
for a wide range of measures to generate and maintain racial wage differentials [see, for
example, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998: Volume 1, Chapter 2, Historical
Context].  Indeed, the ‘linchpin of the apartheid political, economic and social regime was
the purposive control and manipulation of the labour market in a manner which privileged
the white minority while disadvantaging and discriminating against the black majority’
[Presidential Commission, 1996].  While the apartheid system is associated with the
period from the introduction in 1948 of the Bantu Urban Areas Act 1945 until the political
succession of the ANC in 1994, official labour market discrimination can be traced back as
far as the Mines and Regulation Act 1911 [Lundahl and Wadensjo, 1984: 217].  This act
prohibited black workers from occupying specific jobs in the mining sector, and, over
time, this colour barring policy was extended to other races and sectors.  The Pass Laws
which restricted the movement of non-whites, and particularly blacks, between localities
reinforced this policy, as did legislation on job reservation for white workers implemented,
for example, in the Industrial Conciliation Act 1956.  Thus, the flexibility of the labour
market was hindered by restricting competition in certain jobs [Freund, 1988: 128] so
creating artificial wage rates.  Non-white workers found themselves ‘crowded-down’ into
unskilled occupations where, because of the artificially large labour supply, wages were
lower than the competitive norm.1  Alongside such legislation, racially segregated
education was characterised by inferior non-white schooling which contributed to
subsequent racial productivity differentials [Lundahl and Wadensjo, 1984: 220].  The
Bantu Education Act 1955, which affected only native blacks, was an example of
education legislation promoting only very basic non-white schooling.
Pressure for change emerged in the 1960s as economic expansion led to increasing
difficulties in recruiting semi-skilled and skilled workers.  Industrialists’ demands for the
repeal of apartheid labour legislation [Yudelman, 1975: 983] led to some relaxation of job
reservation and colour barring policies in the 1970s in spite of initial resistance from the
National Party.  Nevertheless, restrictions in the labour market continued to exist with, for
example, skilled jobs in the mining industry still reserved for whites by law as recently as
1989 [Presidential Commission, 1996].  The 1970s also saw greater public expenditure
on non-white schooling, with black education expenditure increasing by an average of 26
per cent per annum between 1973 and 1977 compared with 5.5 per cent per annum
between 1948 and 1960 [Lundahl and Wadensjo, 1984: 225], and the number of black
children finishing school rising four-fold between 1970 and 1980.  The decade ended with
the appointment of the de Lange Commission in 1979 whose recommendations were for
further racial equality in educational opportunities [Knight and McGrath, 1987: 49].
According to Hofmeyr [1994: 211] these structural and institutional changes in the
labour market contributed to a reduction in white non-white wage differentials.  Official
labour statistics, summarised in Table 1, illustrate the gradual erosion of the racial wage
hierarchy that is such a well-known characteristic of the South African labour market –
with white workers receiving the highest earnings, followed by asian and then coloured
workers who, in turn, command higher earnings than black workers.
TABLE 1
AVERAGE EARNINGS PER MONTH AND PERCENTAGE EARNINGS DIFFERENCES FROM
OVERALL AVERAGE EARNINGS FOR THE NON-PRIMARY SECTOR BY RACIAL GROUP,
1975-1993 (CONSTANT 1990 PRICES)
Racial group
Year All White Black Coloured Asian
Rand Rand % Rand % Rand % Rand %
1975 1,444 3,066 112 642 -56 1,008 -30 1,190 -18
1980 1,493 2,963 98 749 -50 1,000 -33 1,324 -11
1985 1,635 3,143 92 860 -47 1,135 -31 1,565 -4
1990 1,649 3,020 83 992 -40 1,214 -26 1,680 2
1992 1,791 3,104 73 1,128 -37 1,362 -24 1,872 5
1993 1,807 3,065 70 1,112 -38 1,377 -24 1,904 5
Source: Central Statistical Service [1995]
Yet it is also clear from Table 1 that, in spite of some convergence in earnings,
large racial differentials have persisted into the 1990s.  One reason for this persistence is
the continuance of racial productivity differences due to continuing differences in the
provision of and access to education and vocational training.  Thus Standing et al [1996]
argue that there was inadequate implementation of quality improvements in non-white
education as recommended by the de Lange Commission.  While non-white participation
in education expanded at a rapid rate throughout the 1980s, with numbers rising from
93,258 to 588,842 between 1980 and 1991, non-white education remained inferior to
white education [see also Donaldson and Roux [1990: 446] and Case and Deaton [1997:
13]].  Moreover, Case and Deaton [1997] find that non-white participation and
achievement in education was constrained by household income, leading to the
perpetuation of disadvantage as those with poor education are often unable to secure
sufficient income to provide for the education of their children.  Finally there is evidence
that work-place training provided by some firms was discriminatory with African trainees
set up for failure and tests biased against non-whites [Franks, 1987: 37].  A second reason
for the persistence of racial wage differentials is evidence of continuing labour market
discrimination related to individual and group preferences: ‘Numerous submissions to the
Commission attest to the fact that discriminatory attitudes and behavioural tendencies are
still dominant ... both discriminatory and non-discriminatory (skills-based) processes are at
work in the current labour market’ [Presidential Commission, 1996].
The technical literature measuring the extent of racial productivity differences and
wage discrimination in South Africa is comparatively small and of recent date: a state of
affairs attributed by Meth [1988] to data problems, specifically the initial lack of credibility
of the Current Population Survey of 1970 and 1980 which were only revised and made
consistent in 1986.  Human and Greenacre [1987] using a Mincerian human capital
regression model and the revised 1980 Current Population Census found that age (a proxy
for experience) and education had a positive effect on the earnings of white, black and
coloured workers with the strongest effects estimated on white worker earnings.  Knight
and McGrath [1987] using the Oaxaca [1973] residual difference methodology and the
1976 and 1985 cross-sectional Surveys on Remuneration found that discrimination against
black workers accounted for 45 per cent of the mean wage difference between whites and
blacks in 1976 declining to 21 per cent by 1985, though these are likely to be under-
estimates given the non-representative nature of the sample.2  This decline was attributed
to a change in tastes of employers, supply-side improvements in non-whites’ education,
training and skill acquisition and a more liberal policy framework.  Moll [1992] using the
multinomial logit technique of Banerjee and Knight [1985] with data drawn from the
revised 1970 and 1980 Population Censuses found that coloured workers faced a wage
discrimination term of 59 per cent of the total differential between white and coloured
workers in 1970, with this declining to 57 per cent in 1980.  The slight fall in racial wage
discrimination was again attributed to a decline in discriminatory tastes on the behalf of
employers and employees.  Finally, Moll [1995a] using the same technique with the 1980
Population Census and the 1993 PSLSD household data-set, 3 found that total
discrimination against black workers fell from 73 per cent in 1980 to 60 per cent in 1993.
While comparisons between the work of Knight and McGrath and that of Moll are
problematic, particularly because of biases in the data set used by the former, these results
suggest the persistence of racial wage discrimination into the 1990s, albeit to a lesser
degree than before.
III METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
The economic foundations for this paper are provided by neo-classical
discrimination theory as developed in the seminal work of Becker [1957] and Arrow
[1972, 1973].4   Becker assumed individuals could hold tastes for discrimination which
influenced their utility functions.  Thus white employers might, for example, be able to
increase their utility by underpaying non-white workers to compensate for their dislike of
this group and/or overpaying white workers because of white nepotism.  Similarly, white
employees could command a wage overpayment, and thus utility improvement, to
compensate them for working alongside non-whites.  However, the methodologies
previously adopted to measure discrimination in South Africa have not been designed to
identify these various forms of discrimination which are known respectively as employer
discrimination, employer nepotism and employee discrimination.5
In this section, we develop the methodology for a multilateral analysis of the racial
wage hierarchy in South Africa by generalising existing techniques for the decomposition
of the logarithmic gross wage differential between two groups [see Oaxaca, 1973; Cotton,
1988; Neumark, 1988; Oaxaca and Ransom, 1988, 1994].  Following Oaxaca and
Ransom [1994] the difference in the mean of the natural logarithm of wages for groups j
and k can be decomposed into an explained component which captures productivity
differences between workers, and an unexplained component which includes racial wage
discrimination:
)1Dln()1Qln()1Gln( jkjkjk +++=+ ;   j,k = white, black, coloured, asian  (1)
where: Gjk is the gross (unadjusted) wage differential defined as [(Wj / Wk) − 1] where Wj is
the geometric mean wage of group j and Wk is the corresponding wage of group k; Qjk is
the productivity differential ]1)W/W[( okoj −  where ojW  and okW denote the geometric
mean wage rates of each group in the absence of labour market discrimination; and Djk is
identified as the market discrimination coefficient )W/W/()]W/W()W/W[( okojokojkj − ,
that is the proportionate difference between ( 1G jk + ) and ( jkQ + 1).
Oaxaca [1973] shows that the discrimination coefficient can be further
decomposed in terms of the wage that each group receives relative to that which it would
receive in the absence of discrimination.  This yields the familiar decomposition equation:
{ })1ln()1ln()1Qln()1Gln( kjjkjk +−+++=+ δδ  (2)
where δj is the differential between the geometric mean wage of group j  and the wage that
workers of group j would receive in the absence of discrimination ],1)W/W[( ojj −  and δk
is similarly defined for group k workers.
We extend this standard decomposition equation by partitioning both the gross
wage differential and the productivity component, to yield complementary measures of the
geometric mean wage that each racial group receives relative to that of the workforce as a
whole under both the (observed) discriminatory and (hypothetical) non-discriminatory
wage structures.  Thus (2) can be expanded to:
{ } { } { })1ln()1ln()1ln()1ln()1ln()1ln( kjkjkj +−+++−+=+−+ δδθθγγ (3)
where γj is the differential between the geometric mean wage of group j and that of the
entire workforce ]1)W/W[( j − , where W is the overall geometric mean wage; θj is the
differential between the geometric mean wage of group j and that of the entire workforce
in the absence of discrimination ]1)W/W[( ooj − ;  and γk and θk are similarly defined for
group k.  The main advantage of (3) is that each component of the decomposition
equation is expressed as the difference between two terms that are defined independently
of the particular binary comparison which is being made.  The complete set of γ, δ and θ
coefficients therefore constitute a set of sufficient statistics for the multilateral analysis of
the racial wage hierarchy.
To operationalise the decomposition equation (3), we first estimate, by ordinary
least squares, separate semi-logarithmic wage functions:
giigigi uXWln +′= β ;     g=1,…ni ; (4)
for each racial group i (i= white, black, coloured, asian) using cross-sectional data, where
giWln is the logarithmic wage of worker g in group i, giX  is a vector of worker
characteristics, iβ is a vector of group-specific coefficients and ni is the sample size.  We
also estimate a similar function for the workforce as a whole using the pooled sample of
size n:
;uXWln hhh +′= β      h=1,…n;      n=Σ ni (5)
where hWln is the logarithmic wage of worker h, hX  is a vector of worker characteristics
and β is a vector of coefficients.  Given some estimate of the non-discriminatory wage
structure ∗βˆ , we are then able to derive estimates for each racial group i of the
decomposition terms in equation (3) as:
ββγ ˆXˆXWlnWln)1ln{ ii
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where iX  is the vector of mean values of the regressors for group i, X  is the
corresponding mean vector for the whole workforce, and hats denote estimates.  Hence, θi
may be interpreted as the wage differential between a typical worker in group i, with
characteristics iX ,  and a typical worker in the entire workforce, with characteristics X ,
under the hypothetical non-discriminatory wage structure; and δi as the wage differential
for a typical worker in group i between the discriminatory and  non-discriminatory wage
structures.  In Section V we report the results of the decomposition analysis primarily in
terms of (6)-(8), leaving it mostly to the reader to construct binary comparisons for
particular pairs of racial groups using (3).
All that is now required is to obtain some estimate of the non-discriminatory wage
structure ∗βˆ .  In our empirical analysis we focus on the pooled OLS estimator of
Neumark [1988] and Oaxaca and Ransom [1988, 1994], which Neumark [1988] shows
can be derived from a model of employer discrimination in which the utility function of the
employer is homogeneous of degree zero within each category of labour, that is the
employer only cares about the proportion of each group employed in any particular labour
category.  Extending the application of this estimator to the multi-group case yields:
∑==
i
iiNOR
* ˆˆˆ βΩββ ;   (9)
where )X’X()X’X( ii1i −=Ω  so that Σ iΩ =1.  Estimates of NORˆβ  are simple to compute
since ββ ˆˆ NOR = , the OLS estimator of  β derived using the pooled sample in (5).  It
follows that NORˆβ depends on the characteristics of workers from all racial groups though
individual elements of NORˆβ  need not be bracketed by the corresponding elements of
i
ˆβ from the separately estimated racial wage structures since the weighting matrices
iΩ are not positive definite, except in special cases [Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994].
However, the overall geometric mean wage will be the same under the discriminatory and
non-discriminatory wage structures, that is 
^
o
^
WlnWln = , so we obtain an exact
decomposition of the gross wage differential term 
^
i
^
i
^
i )1ln{)1ln{)1ln{ +++=+ δθγ .
This makes the interpretation of the decomposition results particularly simple.
  In addition, we examine the sensitivity of the results at the aggregate level to
alternative assumptions about the non-discriminatory wage structure by reporting
decomposition estimates based on a number of other estimators.  Thus we also consider
the employment share estimator which was proposed by Cotton [1988] on the grounds
that the non-discriminatory structure should reflect the composition of the workforce and
is generalisable to the multi-group case as:
∑==
i
iiCOT
* ˆSˆˆ βββ ;   (10)
where S
i
 is a diagonal matrix with non-zero elements all equal to s
i
 where n/ns ii =  so
that Σ is =1.  The estimator COTˆβ  is a simple weighted average of the individual iˆβ ’s and
is therefore bracketed by them.  But the overall geometric mean wage will not generally be
the same under the discriminatory and non-discriminatory wage structures [see Oaxaca
and Ransom, 1994], so the gross wage differential term in (6) will not generally be the
sum of the productivity and discrimination terms in (7) and (8), though the binary
decomposition equation (3) still holds by definition.
Finally, we separately consider each of the group wage structures iˆβ as estimators
for *ˆβ , in keeping with the early contributions of Oaxaca [1973] and Blinder [1973] who
assumed that one group would receive the non-discriminatory rate with wage
discrimination taking the simple form of underpayment or overpayment of the other
group(s).
IV DATA, VARIABLES AND SAMPLE ATTRIBUTES
The data for this study is derived from the 1994 October Household Survey.  This survey
was undertaken by the South African Central Statistical Service as part of an annual
survey which commenced in 1993.  The 1994 survey used a complex sample design, with
random selection of 1000 enumeration areas stratified by rural-urban domicile, by province
and by population group.  In each enumeration area 30 households were selected by
systematic sampling.  The household survey contains evidence relating to 103,747
individuals.  With the objective of measuring and monitoring changes in the social,
economic, developmental and demographic aspects of the country, observations were
collected on a range of indicators including personal characteristics, education, and
employment conditions.  While the survey is not specific to any one gender, the limited
female participation in the labour market has meant that the analysis reported here only
addresses the experiences of male workers.  However, the importance of gender issues has
been reported elsewhere [see for example Standing et al, 1996] and should be the subject
of future work.  This analysis is based on observations of employees within the age range
16-65 years; the unemployed, informally employed or self employed and those outside this
age range are excluded.6  Those employed in the official armed services are also excluded
owing to the specific characteristics of this sector.  Finally, those individuals with ‘Other
Education’ were omitted as there were no asians in this category and the decomposition
methodology requires the specification of a common set of regressors.  With these
exclusions the sample was substantially reduced to 17,198 individuals, comprising 7,696
blacks, 3,865 coloureds, 3,772 whites and 1,865 asians.
Turning to the wage functions given by Equations (4) and (5), the dependent
variable is specified as the natural logarithm of the wage rate lnW.  The survey provides
individual observations on gross monthly earnings Y and on number of hours worked in
the previous seven days H, from which the dependent variable is derived as
)H/)4/Yln((Wln = .  Table 2 reports sample average hourly wage rates by racial group
and occupation, which indicate the existence of substantial racial wage differentials both
within the workforce as whole and within individual occupational categories.  However, it
should be noted that the earnings data from the 1994 survey are known to have
shortcomings, notably that disposable instead of gross earnings were sometimes recorded
and that not all non-pecuniary benefits were necessarily taken into account [Moll, pers.
comm.].  These deficiencies may have implications for the robustness of the results,
particularly in the aggregate analysis where the measurement of income is likely to be less
consistent, though the effects are ambiguous.
TABLE 2
SAMPLE AVERAGE WAGE RATES BY RACE AND OCCUPATIONAL GROUP
Racial group
Occupation Class All White Black Coloured Asian
Rand/hr
All occupations 9.45 17.53 6.31 6.92 11.30
Managers 21.86 26.60 13.64 13.55 15.48
Professionals 20.86 26.28 15.73 15.70 19.63
Technicians and associate professionals 16.63 19.02 13.41 15.10 16.26
Clerks 11.18 14.12 9.38 9.84 11.10
Service and shop assistants 8.74 11.54 7.28 8.07 9.25
Skilled agriculture and fishery 7.16 13.60 3.41 6.55 4.73
Crafts and trade workers 10.74 14.44 7.23 9.50 11.71
Semi-skilled workers 7.55 12.62 6.73 7.14 7.59
Unskilled workers 3.70 12.28 3.32 3.64 7.05
Sample size 17198 3772 7696 3865 1865
Source: Central Statistical Service [1994]
On the right hand side of the wage functions, we include explanatory variables that
reflect five basic characteristics of each individual worker: age, educational background,
occupational class, employment sector and location by region.  In addition, two
dichotomous dummy variables were incorporated representing trade union membership
and rural-urban locality.  Table 3 reports mean attribute levels for the pooled sample and
for each of the separate racial sub-samples in the aggregate data set.
TABLE 3
MEAN AGGREGATE SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
Racial group
Variable Attribute All White Black Coloured Asian
AGE Age (in years) 36.94 37.66 37.73 34.98 36.27
AGESQ Age2 1488.02 1543.55 1543.21 1346.25 1441.76
EDNONE No education 0.098 0.001 0.168 0.098 0.008
EDPRIM Primary education 0.170 0.003 0.251 0.240 0.029
EDSECO Secondary education 0.607 0.683 0.505 0.623 0.843
EDDIPL Diploma 0.081 0.184 0.058 0.031 0.076
EDDEGR Degree 0.043 0.129 0.018 0.008 0.044
OCCMAN Managers 0.053 0.147 0.018 0.021 0.068
OCCPRO Professionals 0.048 0.098 0.037 0.020 0.052
OCCTEC Technicians & associate professionals 0.072 0.151 0.044 0.036 0.105
OCCCLE Clerks 0.085 0.108 0.062 0.062 0.184
OCCSER Service and sales 0.099 0.103 0.097 0.062 0.176
OCCSAG Skilled agricultural and fishery 0.016 0.016 0.010 0.034 0.004
OCCC&T Crafts and trade 0.176 0.271 0.118 0.198 0.181
OCCSSK Semi-skilled 0.158 0.076 0.201 0.142 0.175
OCCUSK Unskilled 0.293 0.030 0.414 0.425 0.055
INDAFF Agriculture & Fishing 0.217 0.032 0.286 0.349 0.026
INDM&Q Mining & Quarrying 0.050 0.100 0.055 0.012 0.009
INDMNF Manufacturing 0.192 0.195 0.153 0.177 0.382
INDEGW Electricity, Gas & Water 0.015 0.032 0.013 0.009 0.005
INDCON Construction 0.061 0.042 0.060 0.094 0.036
INDWRT Wholesale & Retail Trade 0.142 0.135 0.120 0.120 0.290
INDTSC Transport, Storage & Communication 0.068 0.116 0.053 0.056 0.054
INDFIN Financial 0.046 0.099 0.021 0.041 0.056
INDCSV Community services 0.209 0.249 0.239 0.143 0.142
REGWC Western Cape 0.183 0.118 0.072 0.522 0.072
REGEC Eastern Cape 0.116 0.088 0.107 0.189 0.056
REGNC Northern Cape 0.073 0.075 0.077 0.100 0.001
REGFS Free State 0.065 0.089 0.092 0.020 0.001
REGKN Kwazulu/Natal 0.200 0.161 0.197 0.049 0.602
REGNW North-West 0.071 0.078 0.110 0.015 0.015
REGGA Gauteng 0.162 0.222 0.157 0.091 0.208
REGET Eastern Transvaal 0.068 0.099 0.091 0.008 0.034
REGNP Northern Province 0.062 0.070 0.100 0.005 0.011
RURAL Rural-urban: (Rural = 1) 0.388 0.110 0.560 0.410 0.198
TUMEM Trade union membership (Member=1) 0.300 0.330 0.320 0.220 0.328
LNWAGE Logarithm of Wage 1.773 2.589 1.387 1.559 2.159
Sample size 17198 3772 7696 3865 1865
Source: Central Statistical Service [1994]
The average age of the workforce in the sample is 37 years with comparatively
little variation between racial groups.  This is the result both of demographic factors and
of labour participation rates with high levels of youth unemployment, particularly amongst
blacks [see Standing et al, 1996].  The educational background of the racial groups differs
markedly with over 99 per cent of whites and 95 per cent of asians having received at least
a secondary education in comparison to the nearly 10 per cent of coloureds and 17 per
cent of blacks with no formal education at all.  This is in part the outcome of the apartheid
educational policies discussed in Section II and now subject to reform [Moll, 1995b].
The relatively low levels of education received by black and coloured workers is
reflected in the occupational distributions.  For example, 61 per cent of blacks and 57 per
cent of coloureds work in either the semi-skilled or unskilled occupational groups
compared to 11 per cent and 23 per cent of white and asian workers respectively.
However, the evidence on the sectoral distribution of workers indicates members of all
racial groups participating in all sectors within the (highly diversified) economy.  It is
notable that a large proportion of black and coloured workers are employed in the
traditionally low paid agricultural sector, and that mining and quarrying remains a
comparatively important sector for white employment.  Trade union membership varies
little between race with just over 30 per cent of black, white and asian sample being
members, whilst 22 per cent of coloured workers are in a union.  Traditionally, trade
unionism in South Africa has been strongest in mining and quarrying, manufacturing, and
the wholesale and retail trade sectors, and in crafts and trade and semi-skilled occupational
categories [Rospabe, 1997].
Finally, the sample evidence reveals regional concentrations of asian and coloured
workers, with far more uniform distributions of white and black workers.  These
distributions strongly reflect historic settlement patterns and the influence of legislation.
Having arrived in South Africa in the early twentieth century, asian workers largely settled
in Kwazulu/Natal and Gauteng [Freund, 1988: 115]; a settlement pattern reflected in the
survey evidence.  Coloureds are largely domiciled in the townships of Western Cape
surrounding Cape Town, in part a result of the Group Areas Act 1950, and to a lesser
extent surrounding Kimberley in Northern Cape.  The Group Areas Act is also partly
responsible for black and coloured workers being more likely to reside in areas designated
as rural than are whites and asians.
V EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The empirical analysis is presented in three parts.  First, we report and discuss the
aggregate wage function regressions estimated for each separate racial group and for the
workforce as a whole.  Second, we present the results of the multilateral decomposition
analysis of racial wage differentials based on these estimated wage functions.  Finally, we
give selected results from the decomposition analysis of racial wage differentials for six of
the occupational categories defined in the October Household Survey.
Aggregate Wage Function Analysis
The aggregate wage function analysis is based on estimating separate wage functions
(Equations 4 and 5) using cross-section data for each of the racial groups and for the
sample as whole.  Table 4 reports the estimated wage functions together with the
associated heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors [White, 1980].  The base case in
each function is defined as a non-union worker with secondary education, employed
within the technician and associate professional category in the agriculture and fisheries
sector, and resident in an urban area of Kwazulu/Natal.  The anti-logarithms of the
estimated coefficients on the categorical and dichotomous variable may be interpreted as
relative deviations from the base model wage rate.
In general, the explanatory power of the regressions was acceptable for a cross-
sectional analysis of this nature though the fit of the white and asian wage functions was
appreciably lower than that of the other regressions.  The methodology stipulates that an
identical set of variables should be included in all the wage functions and insignificant
variables were therefore retained in some regressions.  Nevertheless, the results show that
most of the variables were significant at the 99 per cent level and conformed with
expectations.
Beginning with the age variables, the results for all groups are consistent with human
capital theory which argues that age-wage profiles are concave [Polachek and Siebert,
1993: 33].  To illustrate this result, Figure 1 plots the estimated age-wage profile from
each regression model for a worker with base case characteristics.  The vertical
displacement of the different profiles is indicative of the presence of wage discrimination
such that a white worker with base case characteristics receives higher wages than a
similar asian worker who in turn receives more than similar black and coloured workers.
The wages received by asian workers declines relative to those of other races beyond the
TABLE 4
AGGREGATE WAGE  FUNCTIONS
Racial group
All White Black Coloured Asian
Variable Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
AGE 0.044# 0.003 0.074# 0.007 0.040# 0.005 0.051# 0.006 0.054# 0.009
AGESQ
-0.0004# 0.0000 -0.0008# 0.0001 -0.0004# 0.0001 -0.0006# 0.0001 -0.0006# 0.0001
EDNONE
-0.474# 0.022 -0.451  0.356 -0.286# 0.026 -0.314# 0.038 -0.487# 0.181
EDPRIM
-0.335# 0.017 -0.372  0.254 -0.201# 0.021 -0.188# 0.028 -0.195* 0.077
EDDIPL 0.313# 0.023 0.163# 0.029 0.271# 0.048 0.294# 0.066 0.207# 0.066
EDDEGR 0.558# 0.034 0.370# 0.043 0.529# 0.065 0.261* 0.123 0.523# 0.113
OCCMAN 0.178# 0.032 0.146# 0.041 0.091  0.078 -0.070  0.095 0.057  0.076
OCCPRO
-0.058  0.035 -0.003  0.053 0.030  0.060 0.024  0.093 -0.103  0.112
OCCCLE
-0.248# 0.027 -0.161# 0.040 -0.205# 0.051 -0.294# 0.068 -0.200# 0.057
OCCSER
-0.413# 0.028 -0.255# 0.045 -0.388# 0.052 -0.489# 0.074 -0.336# 0.062
OCCSAG
-0.325# 0.056 -0.134  0.116 -0.710# 0.100 -0.383# 0.087 -0.599# 0.204
OCCC&T
-0.298# 0.026 0.174# 0.038 -0.371# 0.053 -0.357# 0.065 -0.262# 0.061
OCCSSK
-0.509# 0.026 -0.296# 0.051 -0.377# 0.049 -0.492# 0.065 -0.411# 0.059
OCCUSK
-0.781# 0.027 -0.401# 0.087 -0.674# 0.048 -0.716# 0.065 -0.497# 0.074
INDM&Q 0.547# 0.032 0.124  0.099 0.601# 0.039 0.199  0.108 0.678# 0.234
INDMNF 0.506# 0.023 0.173  0.092 0.629# 0.033 0.410# 0.046 0.387# 0.108
INDEGW 0.572# 0.049 0.145  0.111 0.750# 0.071 0.138  0.116 0.491# 0.148
INDCON 0.400# 0.029 0.135  0.104 0.532# 0.041 0.341# 0.050 0.563# 0.147
INDWRT 0.350# 0.024 0.029  0.095 0.490# 0.033 0.260# 0.048 0.277* 0.110
INDTSC 0.506# 0.029 0.060  0.096 0.637# 0.046 0.290# 0.053 0.457# 0.123
INDFIN 0.608# 0.033 0.209* 0.096 0.704# 0.067 0.407# 0.065 0.564# 0.128
INDCSV 0.402# 0.023 0.008  0.092 0.610# 0.029 0.282# 0.051 0.344# 0.115
REGWC 0.038* 0.017 -0.248# 0.043 0.005  0.031 -0.288# 0.053 -0.014  0.059
REGEC
-0.066# 0.020 -0.132# 0.046 -0.072* 0.031 -0.497# 0.056 0.100  0.068
REGNC
-0.259# 0.023 -0.181# 0.044 -0.272# 0.032 -0.770# 0.063 -1.076# 0.218
REGFS
-0.425# 0.026 -0.259# 0.046 -0.538# 0.032 -0.551# 0.090 0.228  0.124
REGNW
-0.133# 0.024 -0.161# 0.047 -0.103# 0.031 -0.666# 0.115 -0.121  0.113
REGGA 0.096# 0.017 0.005  0.035 -0.015  0.026 -0.102  0.058 0.354# 0.041
REGET 0.012  0.026 0.008  0.047 -0.167# 0.032 0.037  0.159 0.682# 0.087
REGNP 0.014  0.026 -0.007  0.051 0.014  0.032 0.189  0.145 0.098  0.143
RURAL
-0.256# 0.015 -0.090* 0.040 -0.179# 0.021 -0.240# 0.040 -0.180# 0.039
TUMEM 0.100# 0.012 -0.052* 0.026 0.239# 0.019 0.135# 0.025 0.064* 0.031
CONST 1.026# 0.066 0.998# 0.151 0.755# 0.107 1.318# 0.138 0.855# 0.183
No obs. 17198 3772 7696 3865 1865
R-squared 0.543 0.256 0.525 0.525 0.309
F-Test 638.0# 39.5# 264.9# 132.3# 25.6#
Notes.  Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent [White, 1980].
             # Denotes significance at the 1% level.    * Denotes significance at the 5% level
age of 40, though this may be a reflection of cohort effects in the sample rather than of the
experience facing an individual worker over the course of his working lifetime.
FIGURE 1
AGE-WAGE EARNINGS PROFILES BY RACIAL GROUP FOR WORKERS WITH
BASE CASE CHARACTERISTICS
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The estimated coefficients on the education variables indicate that higher education
levels are consistently associated with higher wages.  For whites, the wage level of
workers with no education was 64 per cent of that received by workers with secondary
education, while workers with a degree were paid at 145 per cent of the secondary
education wage rate.  For blacks, coloureds and asians the comparable figures were 75
and 170 per cent, 73 and 130 per cent, and 61and 169 per cent respectively.  Thus there is
little indication of smaller education-wage rate differentials for non-white workers, a
finding consistent with similar expectations on the part of all races of significantly
enhanced earning opportunities attainable through education.7
The estimated coefficients for occupational skill categories also correspond in
general to a priori expectations of an association of higher skill levels and responsibilities
with higher wages.  Unskilled workers generally earn the lowest wages, along with black
and asian skilled agriculture and fishery workers.  The highest wages tend to be found in
the financial sector, with manufacturing, and electricity, gas and water sectors also paying
relatively high wages to coloured and black workers.  Trade union membership is found to
raise wage rates for black, coloured and asian workers.  However, the statistically
significant negative coefficient on the trade union variable for whites is unexpected given
the historical importance and power of white trade unions in South Africa [Lundahl and
Wadensjo, 1984; Nattrass, 1981].  One possible explanation is that trade unions can be
highly influential in enhancing non-pecuniary employment benefits - shortcomings in the
data preclude the analysis of these conditions of employment.
Regional variation in wage rates is also evident.  The more remote Free State and
Northern Cape tend to have the lowest relative wage rates in South Africa, ceteris
paribus, while the regions offering the highest estimated wage rates are Gauteng
(including Johannesburg, Pretoria and Vanderbijlpark), Kwazulu/Natal, and Eastern
Transvaal, at least for most racial groups.  The rural-urban variable measures a further
dimension to wage patterns with rural wage rates, ceteris paribus, estimated to be lower
than urban wage rates.
Decomposition Analysis
The results of the multilateral decomposition analysis based on the aggregate wage
functions are presented in Table 5.  The table presents estimates of the mean logarithmic
gross wage differential ln(γi+1) between each of the four racial groups and the overall
geometric mean wage, and the constituent elements from the decomposition of these
differentials - the explained racial productivity term ln(θi+1) and unexplained
discrimination term ln(δi+1) – under the six alternative hypothetical non-discriminatory
wage structures outlined in Section III.  Both the productivity and discrimination terms
can be either positive or negative.  A positive (negative) productivity term implies that a
given racial group receives a wage premium (discount) due to the group having higher
(lower) productivity levels on average than the typical worker in the workforce as a
whole.  A positive (negative) discrimination term is indicative that the typical worker in a
particular racial group is overpaid (underpaid) relative to what he would receive in the
absence of discrimination.  Note that the productivity and discrimination terms only sum
to the mean logarithmic gross wage differential in the case of the pooled OLS estimator of
the non-discriminatory wage structure.
TABLE 5
MULTILATERAL DECOMPOSITION OF AGGREGATE WAGE DIFFERENTIALS
Racial Group
White Black Coloured Asian
Non-discriminatory
wage structure
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
ln(γi+1) 0.816# 0.009 -0.386# 0.006 -0.214# 0.009 0.386# 0.014
Pooled OLS estimator
ln(θi+1) 0.582# 0.005 -0.266# 0.003 -0.229# 0.005 0.394# 0.007
ln(δi+1) 0.234# 0.008 -0.120# 0.005 0.015  0.008 -0.008  0.012
Employment share estimator
ln(θi+1) 0.439# 0.015 -0.177# 0.009 -0.244# 0.009 0.351# 0.014
ln(δi+1) 0.327# 0.013 -0.259# 0.023 -0.020  0.021 -0.014  0.017
White structure
ln(θi+1) 0.350# 0.060 -0.123# 0.035 -0.219# 0.025 0.256# 0.054
ln(δi+1) 0  0 -0.729# 0.095 -0.462# 0.081 -0.337# 0.026
Black structure
ln(θi+1) 0.478# 0.011 -0.208# 0.006 -0.230# 0.011 0.369# 0.011
ln(δi+1) 0.516# 0.021 0  0 0.193# 0.018 0.195# 0.021
Coloured structure
ln(θi+1) 0.432# 0.017 -0.179# 0.011 -0.279# 0.018 0.445# 0.025
ln(δi+1) 0.319# 0.031 -0.272# 0.030 0  0 -0.124# 0.037
Asian structure
ln(θi+1) 0.476# 0.032 -0.156# 0.019 -0.283# 0.029 0.269# 0.036
ln(δi+1) 0.223# 0.027 -0.347# 0.054 -0.049  0.057 0  0
Notes.  # Denotes significance at the 1% level.    * Denotes significance at the 5% level
From Table 5, South Africa’s well known hierarchical wage structure is evident
from the estimates of ln(γi+1).  These imply that whites have the highest geometric mean
wage, followed by asians who also earn above the geometric mean wage of the entire
workforce.  In contrast, coloured and blacks wages are below this level, with blacks
receiving the lowest geometric mean wage of any racial group.  Our preferred
decomposition of the mean logarithmic gross wage differentials is based on the pooled
OLS estimator of the non-discriminatory wage structure.  This set of decomposition
results show that whites and asians would command a premium in the absence of
discrimination due to above average productivity levels while the wages of coloureds and
blacks would be subject to a discount because of below average productivity levels.  Wage
discrimination reinforces these productivity differentials in the case of white and black
workers, with the results pointing to white overpayments associated with employer
nepotism and/or employee discrimination, and black underpayments due to employer
discrimination.  Given the reported standard errors, neither the asian nor coloured
discrimination terms is significantly different from zero suggesting that these groups
experience neither positive nor negative wage discrimination.
Table 5 also presents decomposition results based on the alternative non-
discriminatory wage structures which broadly confirm the results based on the pooled
estimator.  Thus, all of the estimators yield a similar picture of the pattern of productivity
differentials, with whites and asians attracting a premium under all hypothetical wage
structures, and coloureds and blacks a discount due to below average productivity levels.
Comparison of the discrimination terms is less straightforward as the numerical estimates
are highly sensitive to the assumed non-discriminatory wage structure.  But the estimates
based on the employment share estimator of the wage structure again imply overpayment
of whites, underpayment of blacks and no evidence of wage discrimination in the case of
asian and coloured workers.  And, as is to be expected, the results based on the white
structure indicate that all other groups are underpaid due to discrimination, the results
based on the black structure show exactly the opposite, and the results based on the
coloured and asian structures lie in between with evidence of both white overpayments
and black underpayments..
Table 6 restates the decomposition results based on the pooled estimator in a more
readily intelligible form by expressing the gross wage, productivity and discrimination
differentials as a percentage of the overall geometric mean wage of 5.89 rand per hour.
Thus the typical white worker received 126 per cent more than the overall geometric mean
wage, the typical asian 47 per cent more, the typical coloured 19 per cent less and the
typical black 32 per cent less.  However, these figures should not be taken simply to imply
that workers of different races working side by side in identical jobs in the same
establishment are paid differently.  Rather the differentials likely reflect differences
between jobs that fall within the same broad occupational categories of the survey,
differences between establishments and so forth.  As such, they reflect a combination of
the effects of disadvantage and of discrimination in compensation and in hiring.
The decomposition of the gross wage differentials reveals that approximately two
thirds of the white and black differentials can be explained by productivity differences
while virtually all of the asian and coloured differentials can be so explained.  Thus the
white gross wage differential of plus 126 per cent of the overall geometric mean wage
TABLE 6
AGGREGATE WAGE DIFFERENTIALS
BASED ON THE POOLED ESTIMATOR OF THE NON-DISCRIMINATORY MARKET STRUCTURE
Racial Group
White Black Coloured Asian
Percentages
Gross wage differential:  ii ˆW
ˆ/)WˆWˆ( γ=−
(relative to overall geometric mean wage of 5.89 rand/hr)
126.1 -32.0 -19.3 47.1
Of which:-
  Productivity differential: i
ooo
i
ˆWˆ/)WˆWˆ( θ=− 79.0 -23.4 -20.5 48.3
  Discrimination differential: )1ˆ(ˆWˆ/)WˆWˆ( iiooii +=− θδ 47.2 -8.7 1.2 -1.2
Discrimination coefficient: i
o
i
o
ii
ˆ
Wˆ/)WˆWˆ( δ=−
(relative to non-discriminatory group geometric mean wage)
26.4 -11.3 1.5 -0.8
Notes: oWˆWˆ =  (that is the overall geometric mean wage is identical under both the discriminatory and
non-discriminatory structures) in the case of the pooled estimator.  Productivity and discrimination
differentials may not sum to the gross wage differential due to rounding errors.
comprises a productivity premium of 79 per cent and a further racial overpayment of 47
per cent.  In contrast, the black gross wage differential of minus 32 per cent comprises a
productivity discount of 23 per cent and a further racial underpayment of 9 per cent.  The
gross wage and productivity differentials are virtually identical to each other in the case of
asian and coloured workers, reflecting the previously noted absence of wage
discrimination faced by these two groups.
Table 6 also provides estimates of the discrimination coefficients δi which measure
the amount by which a racial group is currently underpaid or overpaid relative to the wage
that it would receive in a non-discriminatory labour market.  Thus the wage of a typical
white worker is 26 per cent  higher than it would be in the absence of discrimination, that
of a typical black is 13 per cent below what it would be in a non-discriminatory market,
and the current wages of coloureds and asians are roughly equal to the non-discriminatory
rates.  Noting that the overall geometric mean wage rate would be identical in the absence
of discrimination, these estimates suggest the scale of the wage adjustments faced by the
various racial groups if wage discrimination was to be eradicated in the labour market.
However, it is important to realise that the eradication of wage discrimination would not
by itself bring about total wage convergence since this also requires the elimination of
racial productivity differentials.
Finally, we consider the binary decomposition of white/coloured and white/black
gross wage differentials to allow comparison with existing estimates in the literature.
From Table 6, the gross wage differential between white and coloured workers, measured
relative to the overall geometric mean wage, is the difference between the wage
differentials of the two groups, that is 145 per cent, and comprises a 99 per cent
productivity differential and a 46 per cent discrimination differential attributable mainly to
the overpayment of whites.  This result is consistent with the slight downward trend in
discrimination against coloureds identified by Moll [1992] over the period 1970 to 1980
having become more marked with the progressive dismantling of the apartheid system.  In
the case of the white/black gross wage differential, this is estimated to have been 158 per
cent comprising a 102 per cent productivity differential and a 56 per cent discrimination
differential attributable to both white overpayments and black underpayments.  In
comparison, Knight and McGrath [1987] found that discrimination against black workers
accounted for 21 per cent of the mean wage difference between whites and blacks in 1985
(though this is probably an under-estimate: see note 2), while Moll [1995a] found that
total discrimination against black workers was 60 per cent in 1993.
Occupational Specific Analysis
The occupational specific analysis allows an investigation of the way in which
discrimination changes with occupational class.  Decomposition results based on the
pooled estimator of the non-discriminatory wage structure are presented for six of the nine
occupational groups identified in the Household Survey: managers; professionals;
technicians and associate professionals; crafts and trade workers; semi-skilled workers;
and unskilled workers.  Availability of space prohibits presentation of the six separate sets
of estimated wage equations.  On the estimation procedure, it is acknowledged that
sample selection bias may occur when estimating occupation-specific regressions because
the determinants of the individual’s choice of occupation is not considered in the model.
Others have sought to counteract this problem by adopting a multinomial logit approach,
though this procedure does not entirely eliminate sample selection bias [Lanot and
Walker, 1998: 329].
The results reported in Tables 7 and 8 support the existence of a racial wage
hierarchy in all six of the occupational categories, with white workers receiving the highest
wages, followed by asian and then coloured workers who, in turn, command higher wages
than black workers.  This finding is consistent with the occupational specific results of
Moll [1992, 1995a].  As is to be expected, the differentials are smaller than those reported
at the aggregate level except in the case of the unskilled workers category where they are
of similar magnitudes.
TABLE 7
MULTILATERAL DECOMPOSITION OF OCCUPATIONAL WAGE DIFFERENTIALS
BASED ON THE POOLED ESTIMATOR OF THE NON-DISCRIMINATORY MARKET STRUCTURE
Racial group
White Black Coloured Asian
Occupational Group Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Managers
ln(γi+1) 0.260# 0.023 -0.586# 0.065 -0.327# 0.066 -0.287# 0.050
ln(θi+1) 0.162# 0.011 -0.406# 0.038 -0.251# 0.025 -0.123# 0.019
ln(δi+1) 0.098# 0.018 -0.180# 0.052 -0.076  0.059 -0.164# 0.048
Professionals
ln(γi+1) 0.229# 0.041 -0.247# 0.042 -0.174# 0.060 -0.041  0.063
ln(θi+1) 0.162# 0.021 -0.175# 0.029 -0.252# 0.043 0.075# 0.013
ln(δi+1) 0.067* 0.033 -0.072  0.041 0.078  0.067 -0.116  0.064
Technicians & assoc.
professionals   ln(γi+1) 0.180# 0.025 -0.123# 0.035 -0.069  0.049 -0.035  0.038
ln(θi+1) 0.054# 0.010 -0.055# 0.023 -0.074# 0.022 0.008  0.016
ln(δi+1) 0.126# 0.023 -0.168# 0.026 0.005  0.047 -0.043  0.036
Crafts & Trade
ln(γi+1) 0.400# 0.017 -0.428# 0.020 -0.054# 0.019 0.070* 0.034
ln(θi+1) 0.167# 0.009 -0.170# 0.010 -0.046# 0.011 0.061# 0.017
ln(δi+1) 0.233# 0.016 -0.258# 0.018 -0.008  0.017 0.009  0.030
Semi-skilled
ln(γi+1) 0.471# 0.039 -0.077# 0.014 -0.051* 0.025 0.042  0.033
ln(θi+1) 0.167# 0.015 -0.018# 0.006 -0.084# 0.015 0.078# 0.017
ln(δi+1) 0.304# 0.039 -0.059# 0.012 0.033  0.018 -0.036  0.024
Unskilled
ln(γi+1) 0.941# 0.089 -0.097# 0.010 0.038# 0.013 0.669# 0.051
ln(θi+1) 0.573# 0.038 -0.046# 0.006 0.003  0.009 0.448# 0.022
ln(δi+1) 0.368# 0.085 -0.051# 0.008 0.035# 0.009 0.221# 0.049
Notes.  # Denotes significance at the 1% level.    * Denotes significance at the 5% level
TABLE 8
OCCUPATIONAL WAGE DIFFERENTIALS
BASED ON THE POOLED ESTIMATOR OF THE NON-DISCRIMINATORY MARKET STRUCTURE
Racial group
Occupational Group Geometric
mean wage
White Black Coloured Asian
Rand/hr Percentages
Managers 16.16
Gross wage differential 29.7 -44.3 -27.9 -24.9
Productivity differential 17.6 -33.4 -22.2 -11.6
Discrimination differential 12.1 -11.0 -5.7 -13.4
Discrimination coefficient 10.3 -16.5 -7.3 -15.1
Professionals 16.56
Gross wage differential 25.7 -21.9 -16.0 -4.0
Productivity differential 17.6 -16.1 -22.3 7.8
Discrimination differential 8.1 -5.8 6.3 -11.8
Discrimination coefficient 6.9 -6.9 8.1 -11.0
Technicians & assoc. professionals 13.20
Gross wage differential 19.7 -20.0 -6.7 -3.4
Productivity differential 5.5 -5.4 -7.1 0.8
Discrimination differential 14.2 -14.6 0.5 -4.2
Discrimination coefficient 13.4 -15.5 0.5 -4.2
Crafts & Trade 7.97
Gross wage differential 49.2 -34.8 -5.3 7.3
Productivity differential 18.2 -15.6 -4.5 6.3
Discrimination differential 31.0 -19.2 -0.8 1.0
Discrimination coefficient 26.2 -22.7 -0.8 0.9
Semi-skilled 6.36
Gross wage differential 60.2 -7.4 -5.0 4.3
Productivity differential 18.2 -1.8 -8.1 8.1
Discrimination differential 42.0 -5.6 3.1 -3.8
Discrimination coefficient 35.5 -5.7 3.4 -3.5
Unskilled 2.82
Gross wage differential 156.3 -9.2 3.9 95.2
Productivity differential 77.4 -4.5 0.3 56.5
Discrimination differential 78.9 -4.7 3.6 38.7
Discrimination coefficient 44.5 -5.0 3.6 24.7
Note: Productivity and discrimination differentials may not sum to the gross wage differential due to
rounding errors.
The decomposition analysis shows that this four tiered wage structure partially
reflects racial productivity differences in all six of the occupational categories.
Productivity differences account for the largest proportion of the gross differentials in the
managerial, professional and unskilled categories.  Such large productivity differentials
may be considered surprising in the case of the unskilled group but might in part be
accounted for by the existence of racially motivated training and apprenticeship schemes in
the 1980s and 1990s.  More generally, the operation of racially segregated internal labour
markets working within a given occupational category, may help the explain the racial
productivity differentials.  However, intra-occupational discrimination cannot be directly
tested for in this analysis.
The decomposition also provides evidence of wage discrimination in all six
occupational categories, though in the case of professional workers only the white
discrimination component in Table 7 is significantly different from  zero and then only at
the 5 per cent level.  In general, we find that that underpayment of blacks is dominant in
the higher status occupations, that overpayment of whites is dominant in the lower skilled
occupations and that in most occupational categories there is not significant evidence of
either under or over payment of coloureds and asians (with the exception of managerial
workers where asians are underpaid and unskilled workers where both asians and
coloureds are overpaid).  The former is consistent with discriminatory white employers
who necessarily work alongside non-white workers employed in high-status jobs, but
choose to underpay them because of their race.  In the lower-status occupations, white
employers are unlikely to have the same contact with non-white workers, the
discriminatory taste is less relevant and underpayment relatively low; employee
discrimination and employer nepotism represent a more appropriate explanation.  That
blacks suffer most from discrimination may be indicative of white employers and
employees not merely protecting their economic position but undertaking deliberate
discriminatory action, otherwise discrimination against all non-white racial groups might
be expected to be similar.
Finally, we note that the relative scale of wage adjustments faced by workers of the
same race but in different occupations will vary substantially if wage discrimination was to
be eradicated in the labour market.  In general, higher status white workers will face
relatively smaller wage cuts than those in semi-skilled and unskilled occupations while
blacks in higher status occupations will receive larger relative wage rises than those in
semi-skilled and unskilled occupations.  On the basis of these results the black middle class
has the most to gain in relative terms and the white working class the most to lose from
the eradication of labour market discrimination.
VI. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The particular contribution of this paper is to provide a multilateral decomposition
analysis of racial wage differentials in the South African labour market using evidence
drawn from the 1994 October Household survey.  Methodologically, the paper adds to the
discrimination literature by generalising existing binary decomposition techniques so as to
facilitate the joint decomposition of the wage differentials between two or more groups
into productivity and discrimination components.  This approach provides the basis for a
multilateral analysis of the racial wage hierarchy in South Africa which allows for the
possibility that wage discrimination takes the form of over-payment of some races, as a
result of either employee discrimination or employer nepotism, and under-payment of
others due to employer discrimination.  In this concluding section, we consider our results
in the light of current policy initiatives to tackle racial inequalities in the post-apartheid
labour market.
Our first finding based on the 1994 October Household survey data is of the
continued existence of substantial gross wage differentials between racial groups in the
South African labour market.  The typical white male worker in the sample received 126
per cent more than the overall geometric mean wage, the typical asian 47 per cent more,
the typical coloured 19 per cent less and the typical black 32 per cent less.  This pattern is
reproduced in the six occupational categories examined in the paper, though the
differentials are smaller than those reported at the aggregate level except in the case of the
unskilled category where they are of similar magnitudes.  The persistence of the long-
established racial wage hierarchy in the South African labour market is indicative both of
the effective implementation of apartheid social and labour policies and of the strength and
deep-rooted nature of social and business attitudes towards race, particularly towards black
workers [see, for example, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998: Volume 4, Chapter
2, Institutional Hearing: Business and Labour].
We further estimate that productivity differences can explain approximately two
thirds of the white and black aggregate gross wage differentials, with the remainder
attributable to discrimination, and virtually all of the asian and coloured differentials.  This
suggests that policies to eradicate labour market discrimination may serve to reduce gross
wage differentials to some extent, but that policies to tackle racial productivity differences
will be more important if the long-term aim is to eliminate the racial wage hierarchy.
Indeed, to the extent that we fail to control adequately for the inferior quality of black and
coloured education, our estimates may actually understate the importance of racial
productivity differences.
In the post-apartheid era, labour market legislation has been subject to fundamental
reform with most employees now covered by a single set of labour laws, including those
working in agriculture, domestic service and the state (Barker, 1999).  The Labour Relations
Act 1995 codifies the limitations on discrimination set out in the Bill of Rights and the
Constitution [Presidential Commission, 1996], while the Employment Equity Bill 1998
and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 1998 seek to promote equity and efficiency
within the labour market.  In particular, the Employment Equity Act sanctions racial
employment targets through the mechanism of affirmative action plans agreed between
employers and employees on statutory Workplace Fora.  The Employment Equity Act also
formalises powerful rights provided by the Constitution for any employee or employment
applicant to institute proceedings through the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation
and Arbitration against an employer for alleged discrimination; the burden of proof falls
on the employer to prove that there were fair reasons for differentiating between
individuals [Barker: 1999].8   
These labour market measures provide powerful instruments for use against the
discriminatory practices and attitudes that have sustained white overpayment and black
underpayment.  Our findings suggest that the wage of a typical white worker was 26 per
cent higher than it would be in the absence of discrimination, that of a typical black was 13
per cent below what it would be in a non-discriminatory market, and the wages of
coloureds and asians were roughly equal to non-discriminatory rates.  That white wages
would fall and black wages rise with the eradication of discrimination is not of itself
particularly surprising.  But the occupational analysis suggests that the wages of white
craft and trade, semi-skilled and unskilled workers might have to fall by  between 30 and
80 per cent of the non-discriminatory rate.  Wage adjustments on this scale seem likely to
provoke opposition from adversely affected groups and will more readily be achieved in
the context of a growing economy where opportunities for realignment are more frequent
and more easily taken.9
Recent policy initiatives have also been taken to tackle the causes of labour market
disadvantage faced by specific racial groups in a concerted manner.  In particular, the
National Education Policy Act 1996, Further Education Training Bill 1998 and Skills
Development Bill 1998] have sought to address the qualitative differences within the
education system, in vocational training and skill acquisition opportunities faced by
different groups [Standing et al, 1996, Bhorat et al, 1998].  Our results suggest that
positive returns to education and training exist for all races, providing the incentives for
the non-white groups to take advantage of these opportunities.  Nevertheless, household
financial constraints to participation in education [Case and Deaton, 1997] may frustrate
attempts to narrow productivity differentials in the absence of significant income and
wealth redistribution.
‘The overall consequences of the legacy of apartheid are deeply embedded in the
polity, society and economy of the country and will not be resolved over night ... (the
legacy) ... tends to be self-reproducing and self-reinforcing in the absence of concerted
policy interventions to reverse this legacy’ [Presidential Commission, 1996].  Although
much of the necessary labour market and broader social policies appear now to be in place
to offer the opportunity of creating a non-discriminatory labour market, it seems likely that
it will take a considerable time for this to become socially equitable with the benefits of
employment broadly and equitably distributed.  There is thus a continuing role for the
regular measurement and decomposition of racial wage differentials to inform policy-
makers of the effectiveness of policy interventions and to highlight need for further
reforms.
NOTES
1.     See Bergmann [1971] for the seminal work on the crowding hypothesis.
2. The Surveys on Remuneration, carried out by the private market research
organisation Peromnes, over-represent the proportion of workers from large
companies which might be presumed to have had more enlightened and efficient
managements.  This suggests that Knight and McGrath’s estimates of the extent of
racial discrimination in the South African labour market will be too low.
3. The Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development (PSLSD) data set is
collected by the South African Labour and Development Research Unit based at the
University of Cape Town.  The data set is a national cross-sectional survey with a sample
of 43,974 individuals in 1993.
4. See Atkins and Hinks [1999] for a discussion of alternative theories of discrimination.
5. Discrimination may also arise due to consumer discrimination.  However, an investigation
of this form of discrimination is beyond the scope of this paper.
6. There is a possibility of a selection bias in this analysis caused by different racial
unemployment rates in South Africa.  In 1994, black males faced a 34 per cent
unemployment rate compared to a 5 per cent rate for white males.  Black workers’ wage
rates might be negatively affected by this higher unemployment rate.  Alternatively,
black workers in employment might be considered to be more motivated than their
white counterparts.
7. By way of contrast, see Neal and Johnson [1996] who draw the opposite conclusion
for the USA.
8. The Government and CCMA uses the media, including the internet, to promote the
activities of the CCMA and elicit reports of potential malpractice.  According to the South
African Business Day [28 December 1998] the CCMA has since its establishment in
November 1996 had over 143,000 referrals, largely concerning cases of unfair dismissal.
9. Opposition to labour market reforms has been led by the South African Chamber of
Business (SACOB) who successfully sought a review of policy on the grounds that it
impeded employment growth.  Subsequent opposition has come from black trade
unions who see increased labour market flexibility as promoting dualism where “those
who are better organised have one set of labour rights and those who are not
organised…have little or no protection at all” [Cape Times, 10/6/99: ‘National
Union of Metalworkers of South Africa to resist labour law changes’]
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